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Destroying the Panthers
The Effect of Allied Combat Action on I./SS
Panzer Regiment 12 in Normandy, 1944
Arthur gullachsen
Abstract : This article is an examination of the operational record of the
World War Two German Panther tank during the Normandy Campaign
of summer 1944. Challenging its perception as mechanically unreliable,
this article argues Allied combat action was responsible for a large
percentage of Panthers that were out of action. Secondly, the inferior
resources of the German tank replacement and repair program were no
match for superior Canadian Army practices during 1944. To support
these arguments the author examines Canadian and German wartime
primary documents as well as multiple secondary sources.

D

ur ing the summer of 1944 in Normandy, the German
Panzerkampfwagen V medium tank, the Panther, was one of
the most dangerous armoured opponents of the Anglo-Canadian
armies. Its design is often described in postwar writing as having
the best mixture of speed, armour, and weaponry on the Second
World War battlefield. Due to this successful formula, some writers
have held up this late war German panzer as the forerunner of the
modern main battle tank concept.1 But this reputation has come
under fire in current appreciations of the tank’s operational record.
The first production model, the Mark D, was plagued by mechanical
defects due to its rushed development and premature deployment in

  Steven Zaloga, Panther versus Sherman. Battle of the Bulge 1944 (Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2008), 75. The main battle tank concept of one tank family for
all missions is exemplified in the United States’ M1 Abrams family of armoured
fighting vehicles.
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the July 1943 Battle of Kursk in the Soviet Union.2 Eleven months
later and on its third production model, large numbers of Panthers
continued to be sidelined in operational units during the summer of
1944. Recent publications have utilised these figures as evidence of
the Panther’s ongoing reliability issues, even during the last year of
the war.3 Evaluating Panther tank operational rates for Normandy,
one would surmise that reliability problems were even more prevalent
and German forces were struggling to make do with an unreliable
vehicle. The conclusion presented is that the Panther was a largely
non-functional weapons system due to its record of chronic mechanical
breakdowns.4
This article will argue that Allied combat action, not mechanical
reliability issues, was the main factor responsible for disabling a
large percentage of Panthers. Mechanical defects in the first Panther
model did significantly contribute to its disastrous combat debut in
July 1943, but by spring 1944 the majority of mechanical faults had
been resolved. While literature criticising the Panther’s operational
record focuses on mechanical defects, the incidence of battle damage
is ignored as a cause. Furthermore, the inefficient German Army
tank repair and replacement system, with its shortages and logistical
issues, created a false impression that the Panther was mechanically
defective. Its slow turn-around times and lack of replacement
vehicles obscured the fact that Panthers were not unreliable, just
being destroyed or disabled at a rapid rate. Due to its adequate
frontal armour, many Panthers were only badly damaged and the
Germans had a limited capability to replace or repair these tanks
quickly. Quick repair was also hindered by the repair organisation
being part of front-line German combat formations. In contrast, the
Canadian Army’s separate recovery, repair, and replacement process
kept armoured regiments well supplied with serviceable tanks on a
regular basis. Within German primary documents, the number of
disabled tanks in a unit is divided between “short-term” and “long
term” repair columns. While correct, these categories imply that the
tanks in question had some part that was broken, defective, or worn
out. Given the Panther’s poor reliability record for 1943, it is easy to

2
  Robert Forczyk, Panther versus T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2007), 32–33.
3
  Zaloga, Panther versus Sherman, 30.
4
  Ibid., 31.
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assume from the returns that these issues were continuing. There is
nothing in these reports that implies high-intensity combat operations
against Allied forces were disabling a large number of tanks.
Recent works by John Buckley and Marc Milner adequately
analyse the armoured battles in Normandy, but the topic of the
recovery, repair, and replacement of armour receives little attention.5
This is an important factor to consider when analysing the operational
record of armoured units. The number of tanks they managed to
field directly influenced their ability to conduct their missions. This
facet of the battle was almost as important as the operational events
due to the rapid rate at which tanks were destroyed or disabled in
Normandy.
In order to investigate Panther serviceability rates during the
summer of 1944, I investigated the combat record of an average
Panther battalion in Normandy. While partial data on the number
of unserviceable Panthers for all nine battalions that served in
Normandy is available, information on exactly why tanks were out
of action is difficult to obtain. Surviving war diaries of the German
panzer regiments involved in the fighting are few. However, one war
diary—that of Schutzstaffel (ss) Panzer Regiment 12 of the Waffen
ss (the military wing of the Nazi Party) 12th ss Panzer Division
“Hitlerjugend”—did surface in the former Czechoslovakia. The
Panther battalion of this regiment commenced combat operations on
8 June 1944 and went on to oppose every major Allied operation on
the eastern flank of the Normandy bridgehead until early July 1944.6
Its war diary contains details on each Panther that was lost, badly
damaged, or broken down.
To support this article’s main argument, a statistical analysis
was completed on the number of tanks lost or suffering battle damage
within this unit over the course of a month.7 This statistical analysis
builds on information already available in order to highlight the
  John Buckley, British Armour in Normandy (London: Frank Cass, 2004), Marc
Milner, Stopping the Panzers (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014).
6
   Vojensky Historicky Archiv Praha (Military history Archives) (VHAP), Prague,
Czech Republic, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944,. Trans.
in Norbert Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of
SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjager Abteilung 12, Normandy 1944. Based on
their original War Diaries. (Solihull: Helion and Company, 2012), 35–96.
7
  Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 35–96. This was completed by using
the war diary of I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, present in the Prague Military Archives
and reprinted and translated in Szamverber’s Waffen SS Armour in Normandy.
5
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Chart 1: Number of operational Panthers versus those in repair for the 2nd battalion, 23rd
Panzer Regiment in the Ukraine, August–September 1943. [Thomas Jentz, Panzertruppen

Volume 2]

effect of battle damage.8 The “Hitlerjugend” Panther battalion began
combat operations with sixty-six Panthers on strength, and received
a further thirteen in early July, bringing it in line with its authorised
establishment of seventy-nine. On paper the battalion consisted of
four companies, each with seventeen Panthers, as shown in Figure 1.
A further eight were to be assigned to the battalion headquarters, and
three were allocated as regimental headquarters command tanks.9
Before examining the combat record of this Panther battalion, it
is necessary to chronicle the transition of the Panther from defective
prototype to a vehicle with average automotive reliability. An example
of late-war German technology intended to have impressive strengths
in armour and weaponry, considerable effort was made to make it
technologically superior to its foes. These strengths were achieved
at the cost of automotive reliability in the first production model.
On the orders of Adolf Hitler, its frontal armour was increased to
80mm, raising the tank’s weight to 45 tons.10 The drive train was

   This table is the original work of the author of this article.
   Thomas Jentz, ed., Panzertruppen Volume 2: The Complete Guide to the Creation
& Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank force: 1943–1945 (Atglen: Schiffer
Military History, 1996), 165–167.
10
  Forczyk, Panther versus T-34, 12–13.
8
9
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initially designed for a much lighter vehicle, and this increased weight
led to the engine, transmission, and final drives being overstressed.
Inadequate initial fuel pump and engine compartment design led to
engine fires during the summer of 1943 which engulfed the tank.
The first Maybach engine was also a weak link, with bearings and
connecting rods that failed after a short period of time. A large
number of tanks in the Panther battalions are recorded as sidelined
due to these maintenance issues during the fall of 1943.11 As illustrated
in Chart 1, these figures are abysmal.12
Reviewing these factors, one could infer that the tank could
not be maintained, taken on long road marches, driven hard, or be
operated by a normal crew past a minimum number of kilometres.13
But was this still the case by the summer of 1944, roughly a
year after its 1943 combat debut at Kursk? By this date sufficient
time and resources had been devoted to improving the Panther, and
front line units were beginning to receive the last model seen in
the war, the Mark G. By spring 1944, the worst of the teething
troubles that had plagued the first model were rectified. While never
matching the Russian T-34 tank for speed and off-road capability,
the Panther was not sluggish. Citing a us Army report on captured
armour, Canadian military historian Roman Jarymowycz highlights
its positive attributes. A salient point within this report is the
Panther’s superior cross country driving ability. Its wide tracks were
excellent for weight distribution, preventing it from sinking in mud
or soft ground.14 The interleaved road wheels, much maligned as a
maintenance problem, also aided in weight distribution and provided
a cushioned ride. Compared to the us M4 Sherman, the Panther was a
much better performer climbing steep inclines and negotiating muddy
conditions. It could manage thirty kilometres per hour cross country,

  Zaloga, Panther versus Sherman, 31. The percentage of Panthers in workshops
was thirty to forty percent of total holdings. Zaloga asserts this was due to mechanical
unreliability and does not mention enemy action.
12
  Jentz, Panzertruppen Volume 2, 116.
13
  Zaloga, Panther versus Sherman, 30. Zaloga states the Panther is an automotive
failure due to weak final drives and an overstressed transmission that led to premature
stripping of the third gear. The Panther had single-tooth spur gears rather than
sophisticated double-herringbone gears, present on Allied tanks.
14
  Roman J. Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Manoeuvre in the
Normandy Campaign. Simonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured Breakout”,
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, McGill University, 1997, 288.
11
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A Panther travelling at high speed through Paris en route to Normandy, summer 1944.
[Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-494-3390-19. Foto: Zwimm. 1944 Sommer.]

which was five kilometres per hour faster than a Sherman.15 The us
Army extensively test-drove captured Panthers in Normandy, films
of which exist online. The tanks in question appear to be driven quite
hard and fast.16 us forces in late 1944 and early 1945 reported that in
tank versus tank engagements with weak German armoured forces,
the Panther had shown remarkable manoeuvrability in contrast to
the us Sherman.17
Automotively, the Mark A and G Panther models were huge
improvements over the disastrous Mark D models (D coming before
A) that debuted at Kursk in 1943. Key automotive improvements on
the Mark A included reinforced road wheels with twenty-four bolts
instead of the original sixteen that were overstressed by rough terrain.
In early 1944 a modified Maybach HL 230 P30 motor was governed
to 2,500 rpm to prevent overheating and the potential of engine fires.
   Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Manoeuvre ”, 281, 286. Major General
White. White Report. Exhibit No 2. Colonel I.S. Hinds, Commander CCB, 2 Armd;
Comparison of US Equipment with similar German equipment. 20 March 1945.
16
  “Tanks Bivouac Area. U.S. Soldiers trees in the background.” Critical Past,
available: http://www.criticalpast.com/video/65675041538_tanks_bivouac-area_
United-States-soldiers_trees-in-the-background, [accessed 2 March. 2015]. This tank
is from the Panzer Lehr Panzer Division and was later shipped to Aberdeen Proving
Grounds.
17
   Thomas Jentz, ed., Germany’s Panther Tank: The Quest for Combat Supremacy
(Atglen: Schiffer Military History, 1997), 156.
15

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/13

6

Gullachsen: Destroying the Panthers
gullachsen

7

Redesigned fuel pumps on the engine were reliable and did not leak.
With the new engine also came an additional crank shaft bearing set:
copper head gasket seals to combat blown head gaskets and dual air
cleaners. Each air cleaner had a different purpose, one cooling the
lubricating oil and the other cooling the engine radiators. Last on the
Mark A came two external cooling pipes on the left hand exhaust
pipe that cooled the left exhaust header.18 The Mark G continued the
theme of automotive improvements with strengthened radiator fan
blades to improve the ability of the tank’s cooling system to remain
functional during combat. Most importantly, all aspects of the final
drives were strengthened on production models from September
1944 onward. These improvements consisted of strengthening the
transmission’s straight cut gears, increasing lubrication and improving
final drive housing durability to avoid bolts being sheared off.19 us
author Thomas Jentz, in his work Germany’s Panther Tank, relates
the following comments of the German inspector of armoured forces,
General Heinz Guderian, regarding the 1944 Mark A model: “The
latest experience reports from the Panzer-Abteilungen (Panther
battalions) state that with the exception of minor deficiencies, the
Panther is at last front ripe.”20
Though improved in 1944, the Panther still had automotive
shortcomings in comparison to Allied tanks. A spring 1944 report from
the 1st battalion of Panzer Regiment 2 states that the Mark A’s engine
life was limited to 1,700 to 1,800 kilometres and the transmission life
only lasted 1,500 to 1,800 kilometres. The report also states that there
were still significant problems with the durability and engagement
ability of the third gear. If a new replacement transmission was not
available, drivers could short shift from second to fourth gear and
get another 250 kilometres out of the tank, but this would ultimately
damage the clutch. The final drives and their housings were reported
to be weak and the Panther could not steer in reverse in heavy soil
or mud.21 The stress the transmission placed against the final drive
assembly while turning in reverse would eventually shear off boltheads on the assembly.22

   Ibid.,
  Ibid.,
20
  Ibid.,
21
  Ibid.,
22
  Ibid.,
18
19

61–62, 78.
89–96.
139.
139–142.
138.
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These were significant failings, but given the large amount of
complete tank write-offs that Germany endured from mid-1944
onwards, the average life span of a tank included very limited
engine mileage.23 If its life-cycle did last months, it was likely to be
placed in the workshops due to significant battle damage. A battle
damage repair job on a Panther could also be used to overhaul the
transmission, engine and final drives. Taking these factors into
account, it did not mean much to a Panther battalion that their
tanks had a limited automotive lifespan before a major overhaul was
needed. A tank would likely be destroyed or would need major battle
damage repairs prior to this.
The operational record of the case study unit for this article,
the 12th ss Panzer Regiment’s Panther battalion, begins with
its deployment to Normandy. In recent works the mobility of the
Panther has been highlighted as a significant weakness. Instances are
recounted that suggest rail transport was used to get panzer units
close to the front to save on the wear and tear of fragile panzers.24 In
reality, the tank’s improved reliability in the summer of 1944 allowed
its crews to conduct long road moves. This was made evident by
Panther battalions in Normandy conducting regular forced marches
during June-July 1944.25
The Allied invasion of 6 June 1944 found the individual companies
of the “Hitlerjugend” Panther battalion billeted to villages around Le
Neuborg, France and the battalion staff company in the town itself.26
On being ordered to the invasion front, the fastest way the leadership
of the 12th ss Panzer Regiment could get its Panthers there was by
driving them. The sixty-six tanks of this unit covered a distance of
140 kilometres to reach the Normandy combat zone, travelling from
6 to 8 June 1944 under incessant air attack. For a tank unit in the

23
  Jentz, Panzertruppen Volume 2, 284. Panther losses as total write-offs for July,
August, and September were 373, 290, and 692, respectively. Total new Panthers
produced for the same months totalled 380, 350, and 335.
24
  Zaloga, Panther versus Sherman, 31. Zaloga argues that Panther units were
transported by rail as far forward as possible to avoid breakdowns. This is true, but
it was mainly to save fuel, which Germany was critically short of. The Panther was
capable of long road marches on good roads.
25
   Two of most significant route marches involving Panther units were by I./Panzer
Regiment 6 of the Panzer Lehr Division, and I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 of the 12th
SS Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”.
26
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
6 Juni 1944. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 35–40.
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Second World War, this was a sizeable distance. A number of tanks
would be expected to fall out, despite maintenance halts.27
The march of the battalion began at 1 p.m. on 6 June 1944
and evening found the companies in the following locations: The
1st Company had reached Berthouville, the 2nd was in Barsen,
the 3rd was in Le Thiel-Nolent, and 4th Company had reached in
St. Claire. The battalion staff company had reached Boissy. Late
evening saw the battalion continue west via the route ThibervilleOrbec-Monnai-Gace. From there the march continued all day on
7 June 1944 via Trun-Falaise-Thury Harcourthen to Amaye in the
Maizet district.28 Here the battalion was dispersed and waited for fuel
on the night of 7–8 June 1944. It is noted at this point that a single
Panther that had become separated from its company rejoined it.29
Frequent maintenance halts and Allied air activity had resulted in
major traffic jams, causing delays.30 Panther crews also drove at less
than maximum speed during road moves to preserve engines and
transmissions. Night driving would have been conducted in blackout
conditions, also reducing speed to a minimum.
Total personnel losses from enemy air attacks during the route
march was one soldier killed on 7 June 1944. Total vehicle losses to
Allied combat action consisted of four trucks and a Flakpanzer 38t
of the anti-aircraft platoon. One supply truck was lost due to an
accident and six other trucks were temporarily out of action.31 To
this point the battalion had covered a total of 120 kilometres from
its former garrison of Le Neuborg. It is important to note that within
the 12th ss Panzer Regiment war diary there is no entry to the effect
of a large amount of vehicles falling out due to mechanical issues.
The largest challenges during the march had been supplying the
  Captain H.A. Sargeaunt, No.2 Operational Research Section, Main H.Q., 21st
Army Group - Report No. 18 on Tank Casualties during the Exploitation Phase
after the crossing of the Seine. File E2004.693 (Bovington, England: Tank Museum
Archives November 1944), 3-4. During the period 28 August–7 September 1944, the
4th Canadian Armoured Division lost fifty-seven tanks to mechanical causes and
only five to enemy action.
28
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
7 Juni 1944. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 35–40.
29
  Stephane Cazenave, Panzerdivsion Hitlerjugend Volume 2: Panzer Regiment 12
Normandie 1944 (Paris: Maranes Editions, 2014), 179.
30
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
6–7 Juni 1944. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 35–40.
31
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
6–8 Juni 1944. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 35–41.
27
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fuel requirements of the Panthers and avoiding losses due to fighter
bomber attacks which caused chaos on the roads leading to Caen.
At midnight on the night of 7–8 June 1944 the battalion was
directed to support the future operations of 26th ss Panzer Grenadier
Regiment. Fuel did not arrive until morning, and by 9:30 a.m. company
columns of Panthers set out to drive the last twenty kilometres to
their assigned jump-off positions. From this date onward the Panther
battalion was engaged in constant offensive and defensive operations
until 11 July 1944, when it was placed in reserve.
Table 1 is the result of statistical research undertaken using a
number of primary and secondary sources in order to measure the
battalion’s vehicle attrition over the course of one month in combat.
This detailed table builds on data that has already been tabulated and
corrects errors within some works. The first column is the reporting
date for when data was recorded. The second column states the
total number of Panthers held by the battalion, both serviceable and
under repair, at the end of the day. The third contains the number
of Panthers that were serviceable on that date. These figures are
only presented on dates when no combat occurred. There are other
reported figures, but these are largely inaccurate due to the combat
losses that took place on these dates. The fourth column states the
number of Panthers that were completely destroyed on a certain date
and the fifth column is the number that were recorded as suffering
battle damage. The sixth column is the total number of Panthers
under repair, calculated by subtracting the serviceable number from
the total holdings. These figures again are only taken on non-combat
days. The seventh column is the percentage of Panthers under repair,
out of the entire holdings. The eighth column is any recorded deliveries
of new tanks.
The first combat operation of the 12th ss Panzer Division’s
Panther battalion was the 8 June 1944 night attack on the village
of Bretteville-L’Orgueilleuse, held by the Regina Rifle Regiment of
the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. On the afternoon of the 8 June
1944 the 1st and the 4th Companies had arrived in their assembly
areas near the village of Franqueville. Secondary sources mention at
least three tank platoons from each company were in action during
the night fighting. Accounts also mention the use of the regimental
command Panther and a company commander’s tank from the 1st
Company. These figures support an estimate of twenty-six Panthers,
a number very similar to the twenty-two mentioned in Canadian
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Percent
Under
repair

New
Panthers
Delivered

14
No data
No data

Nil
10
Nil

No data

Nil

No data

Nil

No data

Nil

30
30
39
24
24
22
20

Nil
Nil
Nil
1[41
Nil
Nil
Nil

No data

Nil

No data

Nil

(3 for battle damage,
No data
1 engine failure)

Nil

Total
holdings of
Panthers

Serviceable
Panthers [33

Total writeoffs[34

Battle
damaged

Total number
under repair

1 June, 1944
4 June, 1944
7 June, 1944

56
66
66

48
No data
No data

Nil
Nil
Nil

Nil
Nil
Nil

8 June, 1944

63

No data

3[35

2[36

9 June, 1944

56

No data

7[37

3[38

11 June, 1944

54

No data

2[39

3[40

16 June, 1944
17 June, 1944
18 June, 1944
20 June, 1944
22 June, 1944
23 June, 1944
24 June, 1944

54
54
54
55
55
55
55

38
38
33
42
42
43
44

Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil

Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil

8
No data
No data
No data (2 battle
damage)
No data (3 battle
damage)
No data (3 battle
damage)
16
16
21
13
13
12
11
No data (3 for battle
damage)
No Data

Date

25 June, 1944

53

No data

2[42

3[43

26 June, 1944

48

No data

[44

Nil

27 June, 1944

45

No data

3

3[45

28 June, 1944

44

No data

1

1[46

29 June, 1944

44

No data

Nil

2 July, 1944

44

24

Nil

Nil

4 July, 1944

44

No data

Nil

3[48

5. July 1944
6 July, 1944
7 July, 1944

42
55
55

No data
28
39

2[49
Nil
Nil

Nil
Nil
Nil

8 July, 1944

46

No data

9

3[50

Nil
Nil

No data (1 battle
damage)
No data (1 for battle
damage)
20
No Data (3 battle
damage)
No Data
16
18
No data (3 battle
damage)
29
29
No data
17 per day

9 July, 1944
10 July, 1944
11 July, 1944
Totals /
Averages

[51

5

[47

1

46
46
43

18
18
No data

3[52

Nil
Nil
Nil

80

35

37

22

No data

Nil

No data

Nil

45

Nil

No data

Nil

No data
29
33

Nil
13
Nil

No data

Nil

63
63
No data

Nil
Nil
Nil

34

23

Table 1: Losses and battle damage within SS Panzer Regiment 12’s Panther battalion, 8 June–
11 July 1944. [SOURCE]
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sources.32 For a vehicle that current literature perceives to be
mechanically unreliable, it appears large percentages of the 4th and
1st Companies survived the road march. In this first combat action
both companies took losses in return for no significant gains in and
around the fortified village. Three Panthers were written off and
two were badly damaged by anti-tank fire and infantry anti-tank
weapons.

  Marc Milner, Stopping the Panthers, 262–263. Canadian sources who witnessed
the Panther assault counted roughly twenty tanks near Bretteville and twenty-two
tanks near Cardonville Farm. As the 1st and 4th Companies were involved and the
total strength of the regiment stood at sixty-six on the 8–9 June, only one of the
companies would have been at their authorised level of seventeen tanks.
33
  Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat
Power and Organizational Effectiveness (Winnipeg, MB: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing,
2000), 360–361. Operational returns for SS Panzer Regiment 12, sourced from
Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (BA-MA) primary documents dated June–July 1944.
Freiburg, Germany.
34
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944,
Tagebucheinträge 8 Juni–11 Juli 1944 uber zerstörte Panther. Szamveber, Waffen SS
Armour in Normandy, 47–57.
35
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, Tagebucheinträge 8
Juni 1944. Anhang 3. Panthers 425, 418, and 427 were written off by A/T gun fire.
Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 41–44.
36
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
8 Juni 1944. Panthers 116 and 425 were damaged by A/T gun fire. Szamveber,
Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 41–44.
37
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
9 Juni 1944. Panthers 325, 328, 335, 336, 337, and 338 destroyed as near Norrey.
Panzer 471 was later destroyed by A/T gun fire. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in
Normandy, 45–47.
38
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
9 Juni 1944. Panthers 404, 327, and 329 were damaged by A/T gun fire. Szamveber,
Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 45–47.
39
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
11 Juni 1944. Anhang 5. Panther 435 was destroyed in Rots. Panther 438 was
severely damaged by tank fire and later retrieved at night some days later. It is
counted as a complete loss because it was abandoned in enemy territory. Szamveber,
Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 51–55.
40
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
11 Juni 1944. Panthers 425 and 405 were damaged by anti-tank fire and 426 was
repaired during battle. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 51–55.
41
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
20 Juni 1944. Panther 438 retrieved from Rots in a night recovery with a prime
mover. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 65.
32
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A sizeable number of tanks also saw action on 9 June 1944. During
the attack on Norrey-en-Bessin, the 3rd Company deployed a total
of twelve Panthers in three platoons.This is very close to the number
of operational 3rd Company Panthers that left Le Neuborg on 6 June
1944.53 A full company on paper would have been seventeen Panthers,
with five in each platoon and two for the company commander and
the company troop leader. On 1 June 1944 the war diary reported
that the 1st and 2nd Companies had seventeen Panthers each and the

  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
25 Juni 1944. Panthers 217 and 438 were total losses. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour
in Normandy, 69–72.
43
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
25 Juni 1944. Panthers 429, 415 and 425 were damaged by A/T and tank fire.
Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 69–72
44
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
26 Juni 1944. Panthers 236, 427, 204, 419 and an unknown Panther were total losses.
Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 72.
45
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
27 Juni 1944. Anhang 7. Panther 405 suffered an engine failure during combat. It
was not lost. No turret numbers on those three Panthers that were damaged by A/T
and artillery fire. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 74–76.
46
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
28 Juni 1944. One tank is mentioned going to the repair facility. No turret number.
Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 77–80.
47
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
29 Juni 1944. No turret number data. One Panther was damaged by tank fire.
Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 81.
48
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
4 Juli 1944. Panthers 117, 228, and 237 were damaged by artillery fire. Szamveber,
Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 81.
49
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
5 Juli 1944. Panthers 418 and 138 were total losses. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour
in Normandy, 84–86.
50
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
8 Juli 1944. No turret number data. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy,
87–88.
51
   9–11 July 1944 was a period of calm after intense combat that saw the British and
Canadians drive the Germans out of the approaches to Caen. It is understandable
that this period would be seized to carry out repair and maintenance on Panthers
as the Panzer Regiment re-grouped south of Caen, hence the high maintenance rate.
52
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944, Tagebucheinträge
11 Juli 1944. No turret number data. Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy,
94–95.
53
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944. Szamveber,
Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 43. Hubert Meyer, The History of the 12. SS
Panzer Division Hitlerjugend (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 1994), 58.
42
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3rd Company only had ten.54 Ten more Panthers had been delivered
by 6 June, strengthening the 3rd Company and finally getting the 4th
Company some tanks. Up to late May 1944 this last company had
only trained on other company’s tanks.
It is accurate to assess the tanks involved in the operations on 8–9
June 1944 as being mechanically reliable in combat, despite coming
off a recent 140 kilometre road march in difficult circumstances. In
reviewing accounts of this action, there is no mention of a Panther
breaking down or being abandoned in combat due to a mechanical
fault. While the Panthers did not fail mechanically, the 9 June attack
on Norrey was a spectacular reverse. Tanks of the 6th Canadian
Armoured Regiment and supporting anti-tank guns south of
Bretteville hit the advancing 3rd Company in the flank with accurate
defensive fire. As reflected in Table 1, a total of seven Panthers were
lost near Norrey over the course of the day as complete write-offs,
and a further three were badly damaged.
A third battle for the Panther battalion took place on 11 June in
the village of Rots. Here the Germans were again overwhelmed, and
eventually the 4th Company and supporting infantry had to withdraw
due to Anglo-Canadian pressure. A total of two 4th Company
Panthers were written-off and a further three were badly damaged
by tank and anti-tank gun fire during the defence of the village. In
action the Panthers again displayed adequate reliability, with none
falling out due to mechanical failure. There is even an account of the
4th Company commander driving at high speed in reverse through
the village during one point in the fighting.
During these three actions Anglo-Canadian infantry antitank weapons, anti-tank guns, tanks, and artillery put the maximum
amount of fire possible on attacking Panthers.55 The ferocity of the
anti-tank fire alone had led to large losses, most notably on 9 June
1944 at Norrey-en-Bessin, where six Panthers were written off and

  Meyer, The History of the 12. SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, D-4.
  Buckley, British Armour in Normandy (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 93. Allied
defense of newly-won positions was particularly effective and used all arms.
54
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3rd Company SS Panzer Regiment 12 Mark A Panther destroyed near Norrey-enBessin, France on 9 June 1944 and later used as target practice. [Library and Archives Canada
PA-130338]

two severely damaged in ten minutes.56 Due to these heavy losses, on
14 June 1944 the 3rd Company handed over all its remaining tanks
in order to be re-equipped back in its former garrison of Le Neuborg,
140 kilometres to the south east.
On 25 June 1944, the remaining three Panther companies
launched counter-attacks against diversionary attacks by the 49th
British Infantry Division on the village of Fontenay Le Pesnel. These
were conducted to draw German forces away from the upcoming 8th
British Corps Operation “Epsom”. During this inconclusive fighting
two Panthers were lost and three were damaged. A further nine were
lost and five badly damaged in the next four days fighting against
the main British attack of three divisions and two independent
brigades. During the defensive effort from 25 June to 30 June 1944,
the Panther battalion employed all operational tanks to attempt to
halt the advance. Encircled at one stage, the battalion was forced to
break out after an unsuccessful relief attempt by the 1st ss Panzer
   Oliver Haller, “The Defeat of the 12th SS: 7–10 June 1944,” Canadian Military
History 3, no. 1, (1994). Meyer, The History of the 12. SS Panzer Division
Hitlerjugend. While recounting the firefight accurately and noting the effectiveness
of the Firefly armament, Oliver Haller and Hubert Meyer quote the losses as seven,
when only six of the 3. Kompanie Panthers were complete write-offs and two were
badly damaged. Panther 471 from 4. Kompanie was destroyed later in the day, for
a total of seven.
56
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Corps Tiger tank battalion.57 Again a lack of German coordinated
tank-infantry tactics meant that Panthers fought alone or in small
groups.
Further fighting during early July 1944’s Canadian Operation
“Windsor” caused more losses. The attack of the 8th Canadian
Infantry Brigade to capture Carpiquet village and its airfield saw
small groups of Panthers from the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Companies
engage in long range fire fights. Though the defence of the airfield
was partially successful, the fighting of 4 and 5 July 1944 cost two
Panthers as complete write-offs and another two were disabled due
to battle damage.
During Operation “Charnwood,” the Anglo-Canadian attack
on Caen, the 3rd Company, re-equipped with thirteen new tanks,
was engaged in combat operations. Attacking to support the 25th
ss Panzer Grenadier Regiment defending Buron, this advance ran
into heavy defensive fire from British tank destroyers of the 62nd
Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery (r a). Firing their seventeenpounder armament from the edge of an orchard, they managed to
destroy several advancing Panthers. Who got the first shot off in an
engagement was very significant in 1944, and this factor influenced
the one-sidedness of this engagement.58 In the fighting that raged
throughout the day, the company took further losses from indirect
and direct fire. As reflected in Table 1, this resulted in a total of nine
Panthers being complete write-offs and three being battle-damaged.59
Following the order to disengage and redeploy all divisional
heavy weapons south of the Orne River in Caen, between 9 and 11
July 1944 the entire battalion withdrew to the south. All disabled
tanks were removed from various workshop platoon locations. Once
across the river, a further failed minor counterattack near Maltot
miscarried and another three Panthers were written off. After this
action the division and its panzer regiment were placed in reserve.
Its new assembly area was St. Aigan de Cramesmil, which it had
occupied by 12 July 1944.60 Temporarily out of the line, the panther
  Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 69–72.
  Buckley, British Armour in Normandy, 90. First shot, first hit was decisive factor
in Normandy tank firefights.
59
   See Table 1, 8 July 1944. Most of the losses occurred within 3. Kompanie.
60
  Hubert Meyer, The History of the 12. SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, 154. The
12. SS Panzer Regiment command post was three kilometres west of St Sylvain, 16.5
kilometres southeast of the Caen Orne bridges.
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SS-Kreigsberichter Woschidlo. 3rd Company SS Panzer Regiment 12 Panthers involved in a
road march during June 1944. [Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-100-27. Foto: O. Ang/1944]

battalion urgently conducted repairs and maintenance which had
been neglected for some time.61
The instances of high losses for the Panther battalion during
the majority of its combat operations are directly attributable to
Anglo-Canadian forces that were well trained, equipped, and using
combined arms teams to defend and attack. Due to poor German
combined arms tactics, armoured forces would often act individually
without artillery or infantry support. Without this support, assets
that could have made things considerably easier for the Panther
platoons were missing. During the attacks on the villages of Bretteville
L’Orgueilleuse and Norrey en Bessin during 8–9 June 1944, lack of
coordination significantly affected their efforts.62 The fault for these
reverses lies with the tactical leadership of battle group commander
ss Colonel Kurt Meyer for not arranging proper artillery and infantry
support. This failure was compounded by the ineptitude of the 12th
ss Panzer Regiment commander, ss Major Max Wunsche, for failing

  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944. Szamveber,
Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 96.
62
  Milner, Stopping the Panzers, 294–296.
61
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to force the issue with Meyer.63 When the Germans tried to remedy
the lack of infantry, Allied artillery hammered its movements.64
A difficult challenge for Panther crews in combat was the
issue of numerical inferiority, a factor which influenced the number
of panzers that were destroyed or put out of action. Instances of
battle damage were far more probable due to Panthers in company
or platoon strength attacking superior numbers of Allied tanks or
groups of anti-tank guns. Numerically superior forces firing at a high
rate would often target individual Panthers with multiple tanks or
anti-tank guns. In the course of engagement that could last hours,
the probability of all Panthers being hit at least once was very high.
The large number of tanks that escaped total destruction and
were only damaged highlights the capability of the Panther’s armour.
The sloped armoured hull that limited its automotive ability was
vital to its survival capability. British author John Buckley notes that
the all-around armour of the German Panther was excellent: “In one
action, at a range of just 800 yards (731 metres), a tank of the Royal
Scots Greys hit a Panther four times with its 75mm gun only to see
the shells bounce off harmlessly”.65 This action, which took place
during the fighting on Hill 112 during Operation “Epsom,” could have
very well involved a tank of the 12th ss Panzer Regiment’s Panther
battalion. The 80mm sloped hardened steel front glacis plate of the
Panther and its thickened turret mantlet could absorb or deflect the
penetrative abilities of most Allied weaponry. us combat reports on
tank versus tank engagements speak of multiple hits on the Panther’s
mantlet and frontal armour without appreciative damage during
extended firefights.66 Provided vital areas such as the fuel tanks,
engine, crew compartment, drive sprockets, or tracks were not severely
damaged, the Panther could continue to manoeuvre or withdraw as
needed. For a Canadian Sherman, there was often no chance to retire
due to battle damage. One direct hit from a Panther’s armament,
anywhere on its hull at combat ranges, could penetrate the armour
with ease causing a catastrophic fuel or ammunition fire.

  Milner, Stopping the Panzers, 294–296.
   Haller, “The Defeat of the 12th SS: 7–10 June 1944,” 13–14.
65
  Buckley, British Armour in Normandy, 32. This event is originally mentioned
Major J.J. How’s book Hill 112.
66
  Jentz, Germany’s Panther Tank, 155–156.
63
64
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Still, non-fatal damage to the Panther by direct fire weapons
could force it from the battlefield. If the armour was penetrated and
a crew member was wounded or killed, it would retire. If it had a
penetration to its flank which damaged the radios or transmission, it
could not communicate or drive properly. If it had a turret penetration
that damaged the interior of the turret or its ability to traverse, it
would exit the combat zone. If it had significant damage to its tracks
or drive train, the crew would often bail out. They could then arrange
to have it towed away by another Panther or Bergepanther recovery
tank to road where a Famo heavy half-track could tow the tank to a
repair facility.67
Any damage to the main gun would force the Panther to retreat.
The 75mm KWK L/70 gun was far from fragile, but at the same
time a precision instrument meant to engage targets to a maximum
of 1,500 metres. Hits to the barrel or muzzle brake immediately
disabled the gun, and often the sights would be put out of alignment
by the shock or partial penetration accompanying a direct hit on
the mantlet. Panther drivers and crew commanders were trained to
steer the tank into incoming enemy fire, as to let the armour of the
Panther do its job, protecting the vulnerable flanks of the tank at the
same time. While this tactic allowed the tank to survive, it increased
chances of hits on the main armament.
Indirect fire and mines were also a problem for German tank
crews. On detection Panthers were shelled intensively with all
kinds of indirect fire and often ran into belts of Allied anti-tank
minefields. Mines and artillery could damage the track and road
wheels significantly, and this damage could take up to a day to repair.
If a mine field was covered by direct and indirect fire, an immobile
Panther would become a sitting target. Indirect artillery strikes on
the turret top or engine cover could cause severe engine or main gun
damage.
To cope with the constant repair demands that stemmed from
combat, an effective repair and recovery system was needed for the
German armoured forces. The main failing of the German process

67
  Waldemar Trojca, Pzkpfw. V Panther Volume 2 (Gdansk: AJ Press, 1999), 3,
22–23. The Bergepanther was capable of towing Tiger I and II tanks, as well as the
Ferdinand tank destroyer. It also had a winch that was capable of moving 40,000
kilograms a total of 150 metres at ten metres per minute. It was an extremely
capable armoured recovery vehicle.
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was that it was located within the panzer regiment, rather than
the responsibility of a separate dedicated organisation in a stable
environment. All the supply and movement chaos of the front
negatively affected the repair process. Panther repair turn-around
times could be extended if workshop units were swamped by a large
number of damaged tanks. Vehicles were prioritised for repair by a
triage process that saw more difficult cases transported to the rear
and others ignored. Maximum resources were allocated to tanks that
could be quickly repaired. The process was also conducted entirely
outdoors, or if the repair unit was lucky, a barn or outbuilding. Due
to the heavy combat of June–July 1944, a large number of Panthers
with the 12th ss Panzer Regiment’s Panther battalion needed to have
battle damage repaired. The majority of the cases which required
heavy repairs would have been tackled by the workshop platoon of
the battalion. The relatively small amount of resources within this
platoon and its proximity to the front made it unsuited for the large
repair demands placed upon it.
According to the Frie Gliederung (free grouping) panzer
division organisation of April 1944 onwards, the repair and recovery
organisation for a Panther battalion was to consist of two parts,
both of which fell under the command of the panzer regiment.
The first was the workshop platoon, which was part of a larger
regimental workshop company that split its resources between the
Panther and Panzer IV tank battalions of a panzer regiment.68
Within the workshop platoon for the Panther battalion there were
four sub-groups: A main repair group, a replacement part supply
group, a recovery group consisting of towing vehicles and lastly an
armament and signals repair group.69 The workshop platoon took on
very difficult repair jobs that often took a long period of time, sixty
work hours or more. Full penetrations of the hull and turret were
repaired, as well as water damage present in Panthers that had been
submerged. Repair and replacement of damaged turrets mechanisms,
armament housings, transmissions, and engines was also conducted.
The workshop platoon was separated into two tactical elements:
  Eric Lefevre, Panzers in Normandy: Then and Now (London: Battle of Britain
International Ltd, 1983), 16–17.
The other Zugs of the Werkstatt Kompanie was for the Panzer IV battalion, the
sister battalion in the two-battalion 1944 Panzer Regiment.
69
  Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers: German Tank Maintenance in World War
2 (Monroe: Panzerwrecks Publishing, 2010), 238.
68
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stationary and forward. The mobile element worked in the assembly
areas of the tank companies, aiding them in carrying out any jobs
that were beyond their abilities. The stationary part of the workshop
platoon stayed in the same place as long as possible. It carried out the
very difficult repair work in a site specially chosen for its facilities,
stability, and safety from enemy action.70
The second part of the repair organisation was the light
maintenance units organically attached to the Panther companies
and headquarters staff company. These were placed under the
command the panzer regiment’s supply company as of April 1944,
but had formerly been the responsibility of the battalion and
company commanders. The new set-up as of April 1944 was designed
to free up these officers for operational command duties. Because the
administrative reorganisation took time, this new organisation was not
in effect with the 12th ss Panzer Regiment during June–July 1944.
At this time each Panther battalion had four identical companies.
Under the new arrangement the supply company was to provide
each with its own light repair group, led a by non-commissioned
officer repair leader. Each of these light groups provided very basic
maintenance in cooperation with the panzer crews.71 Directing these
four light repair groups was a repair staff group, attached to the
battalion headquarters but still under the command of the supply
company. The repair staff group itself had four distinct groups within
its own organisation. These were a recovery section, a spare parts
section, a crane-equipped armament and signals repair group and
a replacement crew for any of the above groups. The duties of the
repair staff group were direction and relief of the company light
repair groups and handling medium level repairs before the workshop
platoon had to get involved.72
The remainder of the supply company within the panzer regiment
was focused on its primary logistical mission. Without its supply
deliveries all combat and repair operations would cease. The delivery
elements of the supply company were divided into three groupings
while in the field: forward, main, and rear. The forward supply group
attended to the daily needs of the four Panther companies and all
their vehicles. This group was in constant contact with the repair
  Ibid., 56.
   Ibid., 18. Outline of repair services within a Panther battalion.
72
  Ibid., 48.
70
71
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Destroyed 2nd Company SS Panzer Regiment 12 Panther Mark A being inspected by the
Durham Light Infantry near Rauray, France, 27 June 1944. [© IWM (B 6046)]

staff group and light repair groups. The second, main supply group
consisted of transport vehicles that carried fuel and new equipment
from army-level depots back to the panzer regiment. The last group
was a rear group, whose duty was supplying the needs of the workshop
platoon.73
If the front was fluid or a German division was retreating or
surrounded, the job of the supply element was difficult if not impossible.
The routes from rear supply depots could be severed and Allied units
could be operating in German rear areas. The supply units could
also be forced to rapidly withdraw to avoid capture or destruction,
abandoning their duties in the process. Matters were made worse in
Normandy due to all German transport movement having to occur
in darkness. From dawn to dusk, Allied fighter bombers were everpresent. Roving groups of Allied fighters would even strafe individual
vehicles and single soldiers if they were observed in the open.
For a German tank unit, losing a vehicle to a rear repair facility
outside the division or returning it to the factory for a complete
rebuild was equivalent to losing it completely. It did not know when
a replacement vehicle would be sent forward, and months could and
did pass for German armour units in Normandy between deliveries of
replacement tanks. To quote Lukas Friedli from his work on German
  Ibid., 40–41.

73
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tank maintenance in World War Two: “German commanders were
loath to write off panzers and instead carried them on their books ad
infinitum, wary of sending them back to the homeland for fear they
would never be replaced. As a result, dead lined vehicles would be
dragged forward during an attack, and dragged backward during a
retreat. Thus they stayed in repair much longer, and the myth was
born that Panzers were significantly less mechanically reliable than
Allied tanks.”74
For the first part of June 1944 the repair workshop platoon for the
12th ss Panzer Regiment’s Panther battalion was located in Venoix,
a western suburb of Caen.75 Its locations during late June and the
early part of July 1944 are not listed in the war diary.76 It appears
its organisation was unique. It is described as containing a recovery
group, a motor and transmission repair group, a weapons repair
group with a twenty ton portal crane and a transport staff group. All
these groups were made up of experienced German Army reservists.77
Reviewing the war diary entries, it appears the workshop platoon did
not receive any Bergepanther recovery tanks. They made do with
Famo half-tracks or utilised other Panthers to do the work of towing
damaged or broken down Panthers.78 No information is present on
light repair units within the Panther companies and battalion staff
company if any were present.
It was ideal for German tank maintenance processes that repair
sites be located near the front lines, in a stable location and part
of the supply network. It was often impossible to accomplish these
three goals simultaneously.79 If the front was moving, a German
workshop platoon could not conduct its duties and move at the same
time. Thus an entire day or several days was lost in tearing down,
moving, and setting up. The damaged tanks also had to be moved,
and that took time. The performance of the workshop platoon was
   Ibid., 8. Foreword by W. Auerbach.
  Stephan Cazenave, Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. Volume 2. Panzer Regiment 12
Normandie 1944 (Paris: Maranes Editions, 2014), 190.
76
  VHAP, Kriegstagebuch Nr.1 der I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, 1944. Szamveber,
Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 221, Appendix II. The commander of the Panther
battalion workshop platoon at this time was SS-Untersturmfuhrer Walter Schmidt.
77
  Meyer, The History of the 12. SS Panzer Division, 7.
78
   Ibid., 9. These were missing in returns of 1 June 1944 and were never delivered
during the Normandy Campaign.
79
  Wolfgang Schneider, Panzer Tactics: German Small-Unit Armour Tactics in
WWII (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2005), 206.
74
75
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also largely dependent upon irregular deliveries of spare parts, tools,
and consumable supplies.80 During 1944 new tank transmissions,
engines, engine parts, road wheels, final drive assembly parts, and
welding supplies were often slow to reach their destinations. All these
factors were then added to repair time for an individual Panther,
which made the performance of the repair organisations within the
panzer divisions slow. Challenges such as in this in Normandy had
nothing to do with the mechanical reliability of the Panther tank,
but often stemmed from the bombed-out railway network in northern
France.81 Sometimes unserviceable tanks could not be brought along
and were destroyed by their own crews to prevent capture. During
the German military’s retreats of January 1945 after the failed
Ardennes offensive, large numbers of abandoned Panthers would be
inaccurately referenced in current works as examples of mechanical
unreliability.82
It also should be noted that the German Army and Waffen ss
in the late war period were diminishing military forces. During 1944
and 1945 they were slowly losing the logistical, training, and repair
systems to maintain and overhaul sophisticated weapons platforms
such as the Panther. The supply and maintenance unit organisations
mentioned in this article were how they would have appeared on paper.
Allied combat action, lack of proper initial equipping and a total lack
of replacement vehicles led to these organisations functioning with
less than their war establishment in men and vehicles.
Supporting these diminishing military forces was an
underperforming German war economy that could not make up
the losses suffered by Panther battalions. It was impossible to reequip the nine Panther battalions in France during August 1944,
each theoretically equipped with seventy-nine Panthers. There were
only 350 Panthers accepted from the factories that month.83 This
  Lefevre, Panzers in Normandy, 15–17. The organisation that had basic spares,
ammunition, and fuel and could help with basic maintenance was the Versorgungs
Kompanie (supply company), which was part of the panzer regiment.
81
  Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy Campaign,”
297–298.
82
  Zaloga, Panther versus Sherman, 30–31. Zaloga accurately claims twenty of
forty-seven Panthers examined by Allied intelligence post-Battle of the Bulge in
January 1945 had been destroyed by their own crews due to their inability to recover
the tanks. But he does not mention if battle damage was a factor with these wrecks,
or the conditions of the retreat that had led them to be abandoned.
83
  Jentz, Germany’s Panther Tank, 122.
80
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production could not match the wastage rate on the Normandy front;
never mind the Eastern Front and Italy. Due to the damaged railroad
system in northern France, even getting new Panthers to units in
combat was a challenge.84
Canadian battalion sized armoured regiments in Normandy were
authorised a smaller number of battle tanks than German Panther
units. However, the percentage of tanks that were serviceable in
Canadian armoured regiments was higher than those in the Panther
battalions. This gap grew as the units of the German Army and
Waffen ss became even more depleted by late summer 1944. The
returns of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade for the period June–
July 1944 report reflect large numbers of serviceable tanks. These
numbers remain constantly high despite occasional catastrophic losses,
such as those suffered by the 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment at
Le Mesnil-Paltry on 11 June 1944.85
What allowed such a large number of Canadian tanks to remain
in action despite losses to enemy action and inevitable mechanical
failure? There were four main reasons. First, the tank models in
question had acceptable levels of automotive reliability. Second, large
road moves that caused automotive breakdowns did not occur in
the limited area of the Normandy bridgehead. Third, the Canadian
Armoured Corps could backload unserviceable tanks that were
beyond the capabilities of the light aid detachments in armoured
regiments. They would be repaired by separate, effectively-run repair
facilities in a stable environment. Fourth, a specialised tank delivery
regiment, the 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (25th
cadr), was dedicated to delivering new and repaired tanks.86
These factors did not ensure that a Canadian armoured regiment
on the front line was always at 100 percent of its authorised tank
strength, but it did give the appearance that their tanks never broke
84
  “Panther Allocations 1944,” Panther1944.de, available: http://www.
panther1944.de/index.php/en/sdkfz-171-pzkpfwg-panther/truppenteile/pantherzuweisungslisten/panther-zuweisungsliste-1944, [accessed 2 October 2015]. German
military archive source: BA-MA Frieberg i Br. Bestand RH 10. Panther battalions
rarely received deliveries of new tanks in contrast to Allied tank units. The 12. SS
Panzer Regiment’s Panther abteilung was allocated eleven tanks on 25 October 1944.
It has previously had its last allocation dispatched on 7 June, which consisted of
thirteen Panthers. These only arrived on 6 July 1944.
85
  Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press, 2003), 76.
86
  Friedli, Repairing the Panzers, 8. Foreword by W. Auerbach
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down. A severely damaged or disabled Sherman could take vital
time away from the light maintenance units within the front line
armoured regiments. Freeing them up from difficult time consuming
work allowed them to focus on the quick maintenance of a larger
number of tanks. Canadian tank recovery and repair units under
Royal Canadian Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
(rceme) command in August 1944 were largely separate from the
armoured regiments. Different levels of the Canadian Army’s vehicle
repair and recovery system were referred to as “lines.” These “lines”
of maintenance consisted of rceme units that tackled escalating
levels of repair work on vehicles. Breakdowns and non-severe battle
damage could be taken care of by second line workshops. Third line
was for the most intense tasks requiring time, resources, and a stable
location to complete repairs. These jobs consisted of fully rebuilding
and reconditioning tanks. Since it was impossible to send a Sherman
or Firefly back to the factory for a rebuild, overhauls had to be
carried out in France and Belgium.
As an example, a 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment tank
in the summer of 1944 could be serviced by multiple repair units,
or lines, depending on what type of repair was needed. First line
maintenance at the regimental level was the attached 84th Light Aid
Detachment. Second line at the divisional level consisted of the 4th
Armoured Brigade Workshop. Third line repair facilities consisted
of the Number 4 Armoured Troops Workshop and 2nd Tank Troops
Workshop at the corps level. The final fourth line assets at the army
level consisted of the Number 2 Recovery Company and the Number
2 Advanced Base Workshop.87
Once repairs were completed, the 22nd Canadian Armoured
Regiment tank began its journey back to the front. If it was repaired
by third line assets it would be signed over to E Squadron of the 25th
cadr , which was the 2nd Canadian Corps rear delivery squadron. Past
this point the tank could be delivered to either one of the two 25th
cadr forward squadrons in Normandy at this time. These squadrons
would then push the tanks forward to the armoured regiments.

  Murray C. Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50: The Story of Electrical and
mechanical Engineering in the Canadian Armed Forces (Borden, ON: The Guild
of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch Charitable Trust, 2008), 327,
Appendix 5.
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Once they received new or repaired tanks, all 25th cadr squadrons
fed them into sophisticated tank certification circuits. Essentially
this was a circle where a tank entered and went through successive
stations before it was declared operational and fully kitted out. This
meant it was fully fuelled, its armament was operational, radios and
other vital kit items were present, and the ammunition was fully
stocked. Lastly, each Canadian tank required a full five man crew.
Crews could consist of new replacements, personnel returning to their
armoured regiment, or crews from broken down, destroyed, or damaged
tanks. The 25th cadr and its multiple squadrons were exclusively
responsible for Canadian Armoured Corps personnel replacements,
and took possession of these soldiers shortly after they landed in
Normandy. Thus the tanks delivered to armoured regiments were not
just new or repaired, but fully armed, fuelled, kitted out and manned
by fresh crews. Large tank inventories in the two forward 25th cadr
squadrons in Normandy, often nearing a hundred tanks, reflected the
efficiency levels of all repair and delivery assets involved.88
The 25th cadr’s C Squadron was effective at delivering tanks
to the three armoured regiments of the 2nd Canadian Armoured
Brigade that it was responsible for. Due to its rapid delivery rate, the
regiments operated a very large percentage of their total authorised
vehicle establishments. The monthly averages of serviceable M4
75mm Shermans for June–August 1944 were 82, 86, and 73 percent
of their authorised establishments. The averages for serviceable
Sherman Fireflies are lower, with returns of 50, 57, and 59 percent.89
Given the limited number of Fireflies and the fact that they were
prime targets for German forces, the latter returns are adequate. The
main reason behind these adequate percentages was the effectiveness
of the 25th cadr squadrons, the high production rate of second and
third line repair facilities and a healthy supply of factory fresh tanks.
D Squadron of the 25th cadr , responsible for the 4th Canadian
Armoured Division’s regiments, was also very efficient. The total
of new and repaired tanks delivered to the four regiments it was
   Library and Archives Canada (LAC), 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment
B Squadron War Diary, RG24 Volume 14,276, File 944/C 01/45 – 05/45,. T-12746.
On 4 May 1945, the squadron had an inventory of sixty fit tanks and thirty-three
unfit tanks for a total of ninety-three tanks. This squadron was responsible for the
needs of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade.
89
  Roman Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy
Campaign,” Appendix E, 336–338.
88
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responsible for in the months of August, September, and October
1944 were 118, seventy-nine, and 105 respectively.90
The Canadian Army repair, replacement, and recovery system
was a powerful asset and one that has received little attention in
Second World War Canadian military history. It allowed Canadian
Armoured Corps units to take serious losses and remain capable
of offensive action. The German Army and Waffen ss in France
did not have a separate organisation of repair workshops, nor did a
specialised tank delivery regiment exist. They simply held onto each
panzer for dear life, hoping enough spares and other replacement
items would arrive to avoid the onset of cannibalisation.
In conclusion, the Panther tank was not a perfect model of
reliability, but in contrast to the arguments of some current works,
it was far from non-functional. A close study of the war diary of the
12th ss Panzer Division’s Panther battalion in the period June to July
1944 suggests a number of limited conclusions. During its combat
deployment in Normandy the tank displayed an acceptable level of
automotive reliability. What 12th ss Panthers were unserviceable
during this period were out of action mainly due to battle damage,
not mechanical failure. Whenever a number of these vehicles went
into combat, Anglo-Canadian forces went to extraordinary lengths
to destroy them, writing off many and leaving others battle damaged.
The repair and recovery assets within the battalion workshop platoon
were unequal to the task asked of them, and the battalion itself
received few replacement tanks.
In the period studied in this article, 6 June to 11 July 1944, the
“Hitlerjugend” Panther battalion was on the front lines for thirty-five
days. Of these thirty-five days, the battalion faced intense combat
for twelve. During these twelve days, it lost thirty-three Panthers
as total write offs and twenty-two to battle damage. Nearly five
Panthers were knocked out each time the battalion’s companies made
contact with Anglo-Canadian forces. Out of an authorised strength
of seventy-nine Panthers, it never had more than sixty-six tanks on
hand. The average daily number that was serviceable was thirty-five.
Prior to combat in Normandy, the battalion’s vehicles
demonstrated their automotive reliability by completing a 140
  LAC, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment D Squadron War Diary, RG24
Volume 14,278, File 944/E 03/43-10/44. T-12748. A Canadian armoured regiment
had an establishment of 72 tanks in May 1945.
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kilometre road march in difficult conditions. A large number of tanks
took part in the 8 June 1944 night attack against the village of
Bretteville L’Orgueilleuse, verifying that a majority of the Panthers
completed the march. Secondary sources containing data on Panther
unit strength returns supply correct, but misleading information.
Columns titled “short-term repair” and “long-term repair” suggest
they were there due to mechanical faults. This was not the case
for the majority of tanks within the case study unit in this article.
During its first month of combat, the Panthers of the 12th ss Panzer
Regiment were placed in challenging combat situations, facing Allied
forces that had large material resources and that were becoming
more tactically proficient daily. The opposing First Canadian Army
in Normandy had a much more effective system in place to replace
broken, damaged, and destroyed tanks with new operational ones.
Starved of new replacement tanks and forced to conduct repairs near
the chaos of the front lines, the German repair and recovery system
in comparison was a model of poor performance.
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